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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the wireless synchronization prob-
lem which requires devices activated at different times on
a congested single-hop radio network to synchronize their
round numbering. We assume a collection of n synchronous
devices with access to a shared band of the radio spectrum,
divided into F narrowband frequencies. We assume that the
communication medium suffers from unpredictable, perhaps
even malicious interference, which we model by an adversary
that can disrupt up to t frequencies per round. Devices be-
gin executing in different rounds and the exact number of
participants is not known in advance.
We first prove a lower bound, demonstrating that at least
Ω
“
log2 n
(F−t) log logn +
Ft
F−t logn
”
rounds are needed to synchro-
nize. We then describe two algorithms. The first algorithm
almost matches the lower bound, yielding a running time of
O
“
F
F−t log
2 n+ FtF−t logn
”
rounds. The second algorithm
is adaptive, terminating in O
`
t′ log3 n
´
rounds in good ex-
ecutions, that is, when the devices begin executing at the
same time, and there are never more than t′ frequencies dis-
rupted in any given round, for some t′ < t. In all executions,
even those that are not good, it terminates in O
`F log3 n´
rounds.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Synchronization is a fundamental problem in distributed
systems: a set of (possibly unreliable) machines, commu-
nicating over a (possibly unreliable) network, attempt to
establish a shared temporal frame-of-reference. Such syn-
chronization is critical for a wide variety of protocols and
applications. In this paper, we consider the problem of syn-
chronization in wireless networks. In fact, a large class of
wireless algorithms operate under the assumption that syn-
chronization has already been achieved: time is typically
divided into uniform rounds and all the devices start in the
same round. In practice, however, this is rarely the case.
The Challenges of Radio Network Synchronization.
A major challenge in wireless networks is overcoming the
idiosyncratic nature of radio communication. Typically, al-
gorithm designers assume that their protocol has exclusive
access to single communication frequency on which messages
can be reliably sent and received. In reality, however, an in-
creasing amount of wireless networking occurs on the un-
licensed bands of the radio spectrum. For example, the
2.4 Ghz band is used by 802.11, Bluetooth, Zigbee, cord-
less phones, and a growing number of proprietary devices.
These bands are typically divided into independent narrow-
band communication frequencies; 802.11, for example, di-
vides the 2.4 Ghz band into roughly 12 frequencies, while
Bluetooth divides it into roughly 75.
A device operating in this setting must tolerate a (poten-
tially) significant amount of unpredictable disruption. This
disruption may be caused by unrelated devices running un-
related protocols; or it may be caused by nearby electronic
appliances that induce electromagnetic noise. (Microwaves,
for example, are notorious for causing serious disruption on
the 2.4 Ghz band.) Recent studies have shown this inter-
ference to be both prevalent and harmful [20]. In addition,
since the airwaves are open, disruption may also be caused
by a malicious attacker—for example, a malcontent with a
signal jammer attempting to block a Starbucks base station.
Distributed computing in this age of open airwaves is a de-
cidedly non-trivial affair.
The Disrupted Radio Network Model.
The disrupted radio network model captures the core char-
acteristics of this increasingly relevant setting. (We intro-
duced this model in [19, 16, 15]. It has since been adopted
and studied by other researchers [30, 31, 29].) We con-
sider a single-hop radio network comprised of F independent
communication frequencies. In each round, each device can
choose one frequency on which to participate. We incarnate
the diversity of possible disruption sources with a single ad-
versary that can choose up to t < F frequencies per round
to disrupt, preventing communication, where t is a known
bound. This model is simple enough to produce strong theo-
retical bounds, and yet still realistic enough that the results
are relevant to real world networking on shared channels.
Wireless Synchronization.
We focus on the problem of synchronizing wireless de-
vices in a disrupted radio network. We assume that the
devices come together in an ad hoc manner: they are acti-
vated at different times, and only a loose (arbitrarily bad)
upper bound on the total number of participants is known in
advance. The goal of the wireless synchronization problem
is to establish a a global round numbering that is shared
among all participants.
The resulting synchronized rounds are a crucial building
block for coordinating wireless devices. For example, con-
sider Bluetooth-style protocols that use pseudorandom fre-
quency hopping to avoid interference; a common round num-
bering is needed to coordinate the choice of frequency in each
round. A common round numbering also allows protocols
to periodically run initialization and maintenance protocols
(say, in every round r such that r mod k = 0); these proto-
cols might count the currently participating devices, assign
unique names, allocate a TDMA schedule, establish a group
key (see, e.g., [16]), or elect a leader. (This would allow, for
example, Bluetooth to operate without the need for a user
to manually designate one device as the master.) Almost
all existing protocols for such problems assume that partic-
ipating devices begin the protocol at the same time. Thus,
given a shared global round numbering, we can transform
a variety of existing results into more robust protocols that
can tolerate a more realistic ad hoc setting.
Our Results.
We begin by proving a lower bound on the efficiency of
synchronization: any regular synchronization protocol re-
quires at least Ω
“
log2 N
(F−t) log logN +
Ft
F−t logN
”
rounds for some
device to synchronize, where N is the upperbound on par-
ticipants. (A regular protocol is one in which devices behave
in a uniform fashion prior to receiving their first message.
Both algorithms in this paper are regular.) The first term
derives from a non-trivial generalization of the argument
used by [22] in analyzing the wake-up problem. The second
term comes from demonstrating an adversarial strategy for
keeping the probability of coordination low.
We continue by describing the Trapdoor Protocol, an al-
gorithm that provides an (almost tight) solution to the prob-
lem of wireless synchronization. Every device completes the
synchronization protocol withinO
“
F
F−t log
2N + FtF−t logN
”
rounds (with high probability). The Trapdoor Protocol runs
a competition among the participants, where the winner gets
to determine the round numbering scheme that is adopted
by all the other participants. (The losers fall through the
“trapdoor.”)
We then present a variant of the Trapdoor Protocol, known
as the Good Samaritan Protocol, that is optimistic and
adaptive: when all the devices begin in the same round,
its running time depends only on the number of frequencies
actually disrupted (rather than on the worst-case possible
disruption). Specifically, if all devices begin at the same
time and the adversary disrupts at most t′ < t of the F
available frequencies per round, then every device is syn-
chronized within O(t′ log3N) rounds. In executions that do
not satisfy these optimistic assumptions, the protocol termi-
nates within O(F log3N) rounds.
Two key challenges arise in designing an adaptive pro-
tocol. First, when only a small number of frequencies are
disrupted, the protocol must complete quickly; this limits
the devices to using a small number of frequencies. The
adversary, however, may be able to block all of these fre-
quencies, making it hard for a device to determine whether
it has succeeded. (Recall, a device does not know how many
other participants, if any, have been activated.) To solve
this problem, we designate some of the participants as good
samaritans, whose role is to help the contenders determine
whether or not they have won the competition. The second
challenge is dealing with newly arrived devices. Because
these devices must focus their attention on a small num-
ber of frequencies (in order to complete quickly), there may
be a disproportionate amount of interference on these fre-
quencies, which may delay other devices. Coordinating the
optimistic and pessimistic portion of the protocols in order
to ensure that at most one contender wins the competition
requires carefully managing of the newly arrived devices to
prevent too much contention from building up.
2. MODEL
As in [19, 16, 15], we assume a single-hop radio network.
Time is divided into synchronized slots, called rounds. We
assume N devices—called nodes—that begin the execution
inactive. At the beginning of each round, an adversary
chooses which, if any, of the inactive nodes to activate. De-
vices have no a priori knowledge of the global round number:
when a node is activated, it considers the current round to
be the first. Nodes do not know in advance the total number
of nodes n < N that will eventually be activated.
The radio network consists of F ≥ 1 disjoint narrowband
communication frequencies, where N ≥ F . In each round,
each node chooses a single frequency on which to participate,
and chooses whether to broadcast or receive. (It receives no
information from other frequencies.) If two or more nodes
broadcast on the same frequency, then the receivers on that
frequency receive nothing, due to collision.
We assume an interference adversary that can disrupt up
to t < F frequencies per round, where t is a known upper
bound. By disrupting a frequency, the adversary prevents
any node from receiving a message on that frequency. A
node receives a message on a frequency f only if exactly one
node broadcasts on f , and the adversary does not disrupt
f . The adversary chooses its behavior for round r based
only on knowledge of the protocol being executed and the
completed execution up to the end of round r − 1. As pre-
viously stated, the adversary incarnates the diversity of un-
predictable sources of interference that might occur on the
increasingly crowded unlicensed bands. It does not neces-
sarily represent a literal adversarial device.
3. WIRELESS SYNCHRONIZATION
Wireless synchronization is achieved when the activated
nodes share a consistent round numbering scheme. There
are five requirements:
1. Validity: In every round, every activated node outputs
a value in N⊥ = N∪{⊥}. If a node outputs a number,
then we consider that to be the round number; if a
not outputs ⊥, then it has not yet determined a round
number.
2. Synch Commit: Once a node outputs a non-⊥ value
(in N), it never again outputs ⊥.
3. Correctness: The round number increments in each
round: if a node outputs i in round r, then it outputs
i+ 1 in round r + 1.
4. Agreement: In every round, all non-⊥ outputs are the
same, with high probability.
5. Liveness: Eventually, every active node stops outputting
⊥, with probability 1.
The synch commit property ensures that each node knows
when it has successfully synchronized. Once synchronization
has been achieved, the round number continues to increment
(as per correctness). These guarantees ensure that a syn-
chronization routine can safely be used as a building block
for a protocol that depends on round numbers. We say that
an algorithm solves the wireless synchronization problem in
time T if and only if liveness is achieved by round T , with
high probability.
4. RELATEDWORK
A substantial fraction of theoretical work on radio net-
works has focused on the problem of broadcast; c.f., [4, 5, 26,
24, 25, 27, 28, 3, 7, 10, 9, 13, 14]. Wireless synchronization,
however, is more closely related to the wake-up problem, in
which active devices attempt to awaken inactive devices with
a successful broadcast (e.g., [18, 22, 8, 11]). (The wake-up
problem is also related to selectors, introduced by Komlos
and Greenberg [23], and widely used in the context of radio
networks, e.g., [6, 21, 12].)
The wake-up problem is similar to wireless synchroniza-
tion in that it requires coordination in a model with asyn-
chronous activation and (typically) local round counters. By
contrast, however, in this paper we assume multiple commu-
nication frequencies and adversarial interference. Also, we
do not assume that a successful broadcast activates all inac-
tive nodes (an assumption that is sometimes hard to justify
in practice); a node in our model can only be synchronized
after it is activated by the adversary. In some sense, the
wireless synchronization problem is a generalization of the
wake-up problem for more frequencies, in that requiring at
least one node to broadcast alone and without disruption is
necessary, but not always sufficient to solve our problem.
In the systems community, the effort to cope with crowded
radio bands is dominated by the cognitive radio/network
community (see [2] for an overview). This strategy uses
advanced software radios to detect disruption, and applies
spectrum-sharing rules to make optimal use of the available
bandwidth. These solutions require specialized hardware,
the ability to detect interference, and the assumption that
interference is non-dynamic. Solutions in our model apply
to commodity hardware (that cannot necessarily detect in-
terference) and makes no assumptions about the behavior of
other devices or electromagnetic interference.
We introduced the disrupted radio model in [15], where
we studied oblivious gossip protocols, assuming that every
device is activated in the same round. In [19, 16], we ex-
amined adaptive gossip protocols (both deterministic and
randomized) in the same model, as well as related problems
such as shared key agreement. In [16], we assumed a more
malicious adversary that could also inject spoofed messages
in the network. Strasser et al. adopted our model to study
practical key agreement protocols [30, 31]. In a recent pa-
per, soon to appear, Meier et al. studied the problem of
coordinating a pair of nodes in a variant of our model where
t is unknown [29].
5. LOWER BOUNDS
We begin by proving two lower bounds. The second bound
applies to any protocol, while the first restricts itself to reg-
ular protocols. A protocol is regular if there exists a fixed
sequence of pairs (F1, b1), (F2, b2)..., where each Fi is a prob-
ability distribution over frequencies and each bi is a prob-
ability, such that for each node u and local round r, if u
has not received a message through r− 1, it chooses its fre-
quency and whether or not to broadcast according to Fr and
br, respectively. In other words, nodes behave in a uniform
manner until they first receive a message. Both protocols
considered in this paper are regular.
Theorem 1. Let P be a regular protocol that solves the
wireless synchronization problem for some F , t, and N , F >
t, with probability at least 1−1/N . There exists an execution
of P in which some node requires Ω
“
log2 (N)
(F−t) log log (N)
”
rounds
to synchronize.
Our bound is a generalization of the Ω
“
logn log (1/)
log logn+log log (1/)
”
bound for solving the wake-up problem with probability 1−,
by Jurdzinski and Stachowiak [22]1.
We begin with a lemma regarding a simple randomized
process in which m balls are thrown independently into s+1
bins according to a specified distribution:
Lemma 2. Assume that there are m ≥ 0 balls and s+1 ≥
1 bins and a probability distribution p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ ps+1
over the bins such that every ball independently lands in a
bin according to the given distribution. Furthermore, assume
that ps+1 ≥ 1/2. Then, the probability that no bin receives
exactly one ball is at least 2−s.
We continue with the proof of the main theorem.
1Farach-Colton et al. [17] improved the bound to
Ω (logn log (1/)) using a linear program-based technique.
We conjecture that the same general technique would gen-
erate a similar improvement for our bound—that is, would
remove the log logN factor.
Proof (Theorem 1). We bound the number of rounds
required for some node to succeed in broadcasting alone on
some frequency. Any solution to the wireless synchroniza-
tion problem must guarantee that this event occurs. We re-
strict our attention to values of n ≥ nmin = Ω(log4N), and
consider only a weak adversary that activates all n nodes
during the same round and disrupts frequencies 1 to t in
every round. Because we assume a bound N on n is known
to the nodes, we define error probability ε = 1/N .
For each round r such that no node has yet received a mes-
sage, we define broadcast probability pf , for each frequency
f > t, to be the probability that any given node chooses f
and broadcasts during this round. (A single such probabil-
ity exists because we have restricted our attention to regular
protocols and an adversary that activates all n nodes in the
same round.) The probability that exactly one node broad-
casts on f in r is npf (1−pf )n−1. As in [22], we call this the
success probability and say that it is a good probability only
if it is at least 1/ log2N . We now introduce the following
claim, which can be found in [22]:
Claim 3 ([22]). Let x = d4 log logNe, mi = bx/2c +
(i − 1)x for i = 1, 2, ..., blgN/xc − 1. There exist no proba-
bility pf such that both 2
mipf (1− pf )2mi−1 and 2mjpf (1−
pf )
2
mj−1 are good for i 6= j.
Fix some R = o
“
log2 (N)
(F−t) log log (N)
”
. We construct a table with
R rows and one column for each i from Claim 3 such that
2mi ≥ nmin. Notice, the total number of columns remains
Θ(logN/ log logN).
In this table, rows represent rounds and columns corre-
spond to possible values of n. We set a counter for each cell
(x, y) to describe the number of frequencies with good suc-
cess probabilities for round x with n = 2mi(y) , where i(y) is
the value of i corresponding to column y. (The success prob-
abilities are calculated by the well-defined broadcast prob-
abilities for the corresponding round. That is, the success
probabilities for a given row x are calculated for the case
where no node has received a message through round x.)
Fix some column y and let n = 2mi(y) . For each round x
for this n, the probability that a given non-good frequency
succeeds in having a single broadcaster is less than 1/ log2N .
It follows from a union bound that all non-good frequencies
fail in x with probability at least (1− (F − t)/ log2N). (No-
tice, we ignore frequencies in the range [1, . . . , t] as these are
always disrupted by our adversary.)
To bound the probability that all good frequencies fail in
x we apply Lemma 2. Specifically, let m = n, s equal the
number of good frequencies in x, p1 to ps be the sorted
broadcast probabilities for these good frequencies, and ps+1
be the probability of not broadcasting on any of these s
frequencies. Because n = Ω(log4N), and for each f ≤ s,
npf (1 − pf )n−1 ≥ 1/ log2N , it follows that ps+1 ≥ 1/2 for
sufficiently large N , as required by the lemma.2 It follows
that the probability that no good frequency succeeds is at
least 2−s. Over all R rounds for this fixed n, the proba-
bility that every frequency fails in every round is at least“
1− F−t
log2 N
”R `
2−Sy
´
, where Sy is the sum of the counters
in column y. Since the algorithm, by assumption, fails only
2nmin is an overestimate of a minimum n needed to guar-
antee a sufficiently large ps+1. We omit the calculations to
preserve space.
with probability 1/N , this probability cannot be greater
than 1/N . To simplify, we first bound
“
1− F−t
log2 (N)
”R
> 1
4
and conclude that 2−S
y ≤ 4/N . This implies that Sy =
Ω(logN).
We can apply this same argument to every column. We
need, therefore, Θ(logN/ log logN) columns each with coun-
ters that sum to Ω(logN). However, we know from Claim 3
that the sum of counters in any row is no greater than (F−t),
and we only have R = o
“
log2 (N)
(F−t) log log (N)
”
rows, so we fall
short of this sum: There must exist at least one column with
an insufficient counter sum from which we conclude there
exists a value of n value for which the failure probability
exceeds 1/N .
We continue with our second lower bound which makes no
assumption of regularity:
Theorem 4. Let P be a protocol that solves the wireless
synchronization problem for some ε > 0, F , t, and N , F >
t, with probability at least 1 − ε. There exists an execution
of P in which some node requires Ω
“
Ft
F−t · log(1/ε)
”
rounds
to synchronize.
Proof. Consider an execution in which only two nodes
u and v participate. Assume that the adversary wakes up
u and v at arbitrary different times. The two nodes cannot
both have non-⊥ outputs before there is a round in which
both nodes choose to broadcast or listen on the same undis-
rupted frequency. We show that the adversary can always
disrupt t frequencies such that the probability of choosing
the same undisrupted frequency is at most c · (F − t)/(Ft)
in every round for a sufficiently small constant c.
Let Ci be the event that u and v do not choose the same
undisrupted frequency in round i after the second node is
awake. Further, let Di be the event that u and v do not
choose the same undisrupted frequency in any of the first i
rounds after the second node is awake, i.e., Di = Tij=1 Ci.
To simplify our arguments, we also define D0 = Ω to be the
event with probability 1. We will show that the adversary
can disrupt frequencies such that for a constant γ < 1 and
all i ≥ 1,
P[Ci|Di−1] ≥ P := max

1− 1
4t
, 1− F − tF2
ff
. (1)
We then have P[Di] = P[Di−1 ∩ Ci] = P[Di−1] · P[Ci|Di−1],
and for all r < ln(ε)/ ln(P ) = ln(1/ε)/ ln(1/P ), we thus get
P[Dr] > ε. The lemma then follows because for a constant
c > 0,
ln
1
P
<
1
P
− 1 ≤ min

1
4t− 1 ,
F − t
F2 − (F − t)
ff
≤ c · F − tF · t .
It remains to prove Inequality (1). Let us consider a partic-
ular round i. We define:
pj := P[u selects frequency j in round i|Di−1]
and
qj := P[v selects frequency j in round i|Di−1].
Note that pj and qj only depend on the protocol u and v
use and on the strategy of the adversary in the first j − 1
rounds. As the adversary knows all this information, it also
know pj and qj for all frequencies j. Let J
+ be the set of
undisrupted frequencies in round i. We have
P[Ci|Di−1] = 1− P[Ci|Di−1] =
X
j∈J+
pj · qj . (2)
The adversary can maximize P[Ci|Di−1] by disruption the
frequencies with the t largest pjqj products. To simplify
the analysis (and w.l.o.g.) assume that the frequencies are
reordered such that p1q1 ≥ p2q2 ≥ · · · ≥ pFqF . We then
get P[Ci|Di−1] = PFj=t+1 pjqj . We define xj := √pjqj . As
a consequence of the inequality of arithmetic and geometric
means, we have xj ≤ (pj+qj)/2 and thusPFj=t+1 xj ≤ 1. To
obtain an upper bound on P[Ci|Di−1], we thus have to find
x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xF such thatPFj=1 xj ≤ 1 andPFj=t+1 x2j is
maximized. Clearly, the xj ’s that maximize the sum satisfyPF
j=1 xj = 1. We claim that the maximum is obtained
3 for
some integer k ≤ F , xj = 1/k for j ≤ k and xj = 0 for
j > k. For the sake of contradiction, assume that this is not
the case. Let s > t be the maximum frequency for which
xs > 0. For a real number ε > 0, we define x
′
j = xj−ε/(s−1)
and x′′j = xj + ε/(s − 1) for j < s, as well as x′s = xs + ε
and x′′s = xs − ε. Note that we can choose ε > 0 such that
x′s ≤ x′t and x′′s ≥ 0. We have:
FX
j=t+1
x′2j −
FX
j=1
x2j > 2ε ·
„
xs − s− 1− t
s− 1
«
and
FX
j=t+1
x′′2j −
FX
j=1
x2j > 2ε ·
„
s− 1− t
s− 1 − xs
«
.
Hence, either
PF
j=t+1 x
′2
j >
PF
j=t+1 x
2
j or
PF
j=t+1 x
′′2
j >PF
j=t+1 x
2
j , a contradiction to the assumption that x1, . . . , xF
maximizes
PF
j=t+1 x
2
j . We can therefore assume that there
is an integer k ≤ F such that xj = 1/k for j ≤ k and xj = 0
for j > k. We then have:
P[Ci|Di−1] ≤
FX
j=t+1
x2j =
k − t
k2
which is maximized for k = min{F , 2t}. This proves In-
equality (1) and therefore completes the proof.
Theorems 1 and 4 combine for the following result:
Theorem 5. Let P be a regular protocol that solves the
wireless synchronization problem for some F , t, and N , F >
t, with probability at least 1 − 1/N . Then there exists an
execution of P in which some node requires:
Ω
„
log2N
(F − t) log log (N) +
Ft
F − t logN
«
rounds to synchronize.
6. THE TRAPDOOR PROTOCOL
In this section, we present The Trapdoor Protocol, a ran-
domized leader-based solution to the wireless synchroniza-
tion problem that solves the problem in time:
O
„ F
F − t log
2 n+
Ft
F − t logn
«
3Note that since we maximize a continuous function over a
compact domain, the maximum exists.
6.1 Description of the Protocol
Fix F ′ = min{F , 2t}. When a node is first activated, we
say that it is a contender. Each contender proceeds through
lgN epochs. (For simplicity of notation, assumeN is a power
of 2.) Each of the first lgN − 1 epochs is of length `E =
Θ
“
F′
F′−t logN
”
rounds. The final epoch is of length `+E =
Θ
“
(F′)2
F′−t logN
”
rounds.
At the beginning of round r of epoch e, every contender
chooses a frequency f uniformly at random from [1, . . . ,F ′].
It then broadcasts a “contender” message on frequency f
with probability 2
e
2N
(see Figure 1). The message is labelled
with the contender’s timestamp, a pair (ra, uid), where ra is
the number of rounds the contender has been active, and uid
is a unique identifier.4 Otherwise, it listens on frequency f .
If a contender receives a message from another contender,
and the sender has a larger timestamp (by lexicographic
order), then the receiver is knocked out (i.e., the trapdoor
opens beneath its feet). A node that is knocked out contin-
ues to listen on a random channel (choosen from [1, . . . ,F ′])
in every round. If a contender completes all lgN epochs
without being knocked out, then it becomes a leader.
As soon as some contender becomes a leader, it chooses
a numbering scheme for the rounds, and begins to out-
put a round number in every round. From that point on-
wards, in every round, it chooses a channel at random (from
[1, . . . ,F ′]) and sends a message containing the number-
ing scheme with probability 1/2. Any node that receives
a message from a leader immediately abandons the proto-
col, adopts the specified numbering scheme, and begins to
output a round number in every round.
6.2 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the Trapdoor Protocol. Through-
out, when we say that a claim holds “with high probability,”
we mean with probability 1− 1/N . (It is easy to generalize
the protocol such that the probability of error is polynomi-
ally small in N .) We begin, however, with some notation.
We assume a global round counter (unknown to the indi-
vidual nodes). We denote by pru the probability that node
u broadcasts in round r. For each round r, we define the
broadcast weight W (r) =
P
u p
r
u. We also note the follow-
ing two probability facts, which follow from the standard
approximation that (1−x)x ≈ 1/e, and by rewriting (1− p)
as ((1− p)p)1/p.
Fact 6.
• For any p > 0: (1− p) < e−p.
• For any p ≤ 1/2: (1− p) ≥ (1/4)p.
We first bound the probability that a contender is knocked
out in a given round r. The probability that a contender
is knocked out depends on the broadcast weight of the con-
tenders that have a larger timestamp. We thus define S(r, u)
as follows:
4A unique identifier can be generated at random when a
node is first activated by choosing an integer uniformly at
random from a range [1, . . . , cN2], where the constant c is
chosen to be sufficiently large, as a function of the desired
error probability.
Epoch # 1 2 . . . N − 1 lgN
Length Θ
“
F′
F′−t logN
”
Θ
“
F′
F′−t logN
”
. . . Θ
“
F′
F′−t logN
”
Θ
“
(F′)2
F′−t logN
”
Prob. 1/N 2/N . . . 1/4 1/2
Figure 1: Epoch lengths and contender broadcast probabilities for the Trapdoor Protocol.
Definition 7. For round r and node u: We define S(r)
to be the set of nodes that are active (i.e., contenders or
leaders) in round r. We define S(r, u) ⊆ S(r) to be the set
of active nodes that are leaders or have a timestamp larger
than the timestamp of u in r. We define W (r, u) to be the
broadcast weight of the nodes in S(r, u).
The first lemma shows that if for some round r, W (r) =
Θ(F ′), and for some node u, a constant fraction of this
weight is in W (r, u), then u is knocked out with a con-
stant probability. This captures the intuition that when
W (r) = Θ(F ′), a constant amount of probability mass is
expected on each frequency.
Lemma 8. Fix a round r and a node u that is a contender
at the beginning of round r. Assume that cF ′ ≤ W (r) ≤
3cF ′ and W (u, r) ≥ W (r)/c′ for some positive constants
c, c′ ≥ 1. Then node u is knocked out in round r with prob-
ability at least:
F ′ − t
2F ′
“ c
c′
”„1
4
«3c
.
Proof. Fix f to be the frequency chosen by u in round
r. We first bound the probability that u listens on channel
f , and f is not disrupted by the adversary, to be at least
(F ′ − t)/2F ′ (since (1− pru) ≥ 1/2).
We next bound the probability that exactly one node from
S(r, u) broadcasts, and no other node broadcasts on f , as
at least:
X
v∈S(r,u)
0@ prv
F ′
Y
w 6=u,v
„
1− p
r
w
F ′
«1A .
Noting that cF ′/c′ ≤ W (r, u), and W (r) ≤ 3cF ′, and ap-
plying Fact 6, this is at least
`
c
c′
´ `
1
4
´3c
, yielding the desired
bound.
We apply Lemma 8 to derive a bound on the probability
that the total weight gets too high. The key idea is that
once the broadcast weight reaches Θ(F ′), the probability
of being knocked out becomes sufficiently high to bring the
broadcast sum back down. In this sense, the probability
mass in our system behaves like a self-regulating feedback
circuit: when it grows too large, it reduces itself.
Lemma 9. Let R be a round in which there is at most one
leader at the start of R. For all rounds r ≤ R: W (r) < 6F ′,
with high probability.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the weight exceeds
6F ′ by R. Let r be the largest round less than R such that
W (r) ≤ 2F ′ and W (r + 1) > 2F ′. Notice that between
rounds r and r+`E , the broadcast weight of activated nodes
can at most double. Moreover, at most N new nodes can
be activated, each with weight 1/N . Thus W (r + `E) ≤
2W (r) + 1 < 6F ′. It follows that R ≥ r + `E .
We divide the rounds from r+1 to r+ `E into a constant
number of equal-sized intervals, and argue that in each such
interval, the total weight is decreased by a constant fraction.
For appropriate choice of constants, this implies that W (r+
`E) ≤ 2F ′, which contradicts our choice of r.
Fix some round r′ that is the first round in one of the
intervals. Choose non-leader node u such that W (r′, u) ≥
2W (r′)/3 (the existence of such a non-leader u relies on our
restriction on the number of leaders). For each round r′′ dur-
ing the interval, there are two possibilities: (1) W (r′′, u) ≥
W (r′)/3: in this case, we can apply Lemma 8 with c and
the appropriate value of c′, and conclude that u is knocked
out with probability Θ( F
′
F′−t ) in round r
′′ (notice, because
the increase in weight is bounded in this interval, we can
fix a value of c′ that works throughout the interval); (2)
W (r′′, u) < W (r′)/3: in this case, we can conclude that at
least 1/3 of the broadcast weight W (r′) has been knocked
out between the rounds r′ and r′′. If case (2) occurs even
once, then the weight has been reduced by a constant frac-
tion in this interval, as desired. Otherwise, case (1) oc-
curs in each of the Θ( F
′
F′−t logN) rounds of the interval,
and node u is therefore knocked out with high probability.
Taking a union bound over all non-leader nodes u where
W (r′, u) ≥ 2W (r′)/3, we conclude that with high probabil-
ity enough of these low timestamp nodes are knocked out to
also reduce the weight by a constant fraction. Either way
we have reduced the weight at the start of the interval by
at least 1/3 by the end. Over a constant number of such
intervals, the weight decreases below 2F ′, contradicting our
choice of r.
We conclude with the main theorem statement. The key
argument concerns agreement, which shows that there is at
most one leader, with high probability. It relies on Lemma 9
to show that the total broadcast weight in the system re-
mains sufficiently low, and hence any second (potential)
leader will be knocked out as it advances through its final
epoch.
Theorem 10. The Trapdoor Protocol solves the wireless
synchronization problem in time:
O
„ F
F − t log
2N +
Ft
F − t logN
«
.
Proof. It is easy to see that Properties 1–3 of the wire-
less synchronization problem follow directly from the defi-
nition of the protocol. To establish Property 4, agreement,
we show that at most one contender becomes leader. Let
u be the process with the largest timestamp, i.e., u is the
first process to be activated (with ties broken by identifier).
As no contender can knock out u, it is clear that u becomes
leader. Assume for the sake of contradiction that at least
one other node also becomes leader. Let v be the first to
become leader from among these other nodes. Consider a
round r in node v’s final epoch. By Lemma 9, we know that
W (r) ≤ 6F ′, with high probability. We also know that u
sends a message to receiving v on a non-disrupted channel
with probability at least (F ′−t)/(4(F ′)2), and that no other
contender broadcasts on the same channel with probability
at least
Q
w 6=u,v (1− prw). This latter expression is at least
(1/4)6 = O(1). Hence with probability Ω((F ′ − t)/(F ′)2),
node u knocks out node v. Note, the final epoch length is
Θ( (F
′)2
(F′−t) lgN), so over the full final epoch, we conclude that
node v is knocked out with high probability. As this holds
for all v (by a union bound), we conclude that u is the only
leader, with high probability. Property 5 follows from the
fact that for every process w 6= u, once u becomes leader, w
receives a message from u with probability Ω((F ′−t)/(F ′)2).
Finally, we convert from F ′ to F in the final running time
by noting that F
′
F′−t = Θ(
F
F−t ) and
(F′)2
F′−t = Θ(
Ft
F−t ).
7. THE GOOD SAMARITAN PROTOCOL
The Trapdoor Protocol tolerates up to t frequencies dis-
rupted per round. For practical networks, however, there are
often significantly lower levels of interference. In this sec-
tion, we present an optimistic, adaptive protocol that can
terminate faster in executions with low interference. The
Good Samaritan Protocol guarantees that when n ≥ 2 nodes
are activated at the same time, and when no more than
t′ < t frequencies are disrupted per round, the protocol ter-
minates within O(t′ log3N) rounds—a significant improve-
ment over the Trapdoor Protocol when t′ is much smaller
than t. For general executions, it guarantees termination
within O(F log3N) rounds, only a factor of logN slower
than the Trapdoor Protocol.
Throughout this section, we assume that t ≤ F/2 (the
protocol can be modified to work for any constant fraction
of F), and we model the adversary as oblivious, meaning
that it can be described as a fixed sequence of probability
distributions over sets of frequencies to disrupt. This con-
straint simplifies the analysis, but because our nodes always
select frequencies randomly and independently, it does not
prohibitively weaken the adversary. To simplify notation,
we assume that t′ is a power of 2.
7.1 Description of the Protocol
As in the Trapdoor Protocol, every node begins as a con-
tender, and each contender tries to become a leader. Once
a leader, it dictates the round synchronization. Unlike the
Trapdoor Protocol, a contender is not knocked out when
it receives a message from another contender; instead, it is
downgraded and becomes a good samaritan; a good samari-
tan attempts to help the contenders to become leaders. If a
samaritan receives a message from another samaritan, it is
knocked out and becomes passive.
Notice that while a node is participating in the Good
Samaritan Protocol, it ignores timestamps. That is, when
a contender receives a message from another contender, it
is downgraded to a good samaritan even if it has a larger
timestamp than the sneder. Similarly, a samaritan is knocked
out whenever it receives a message from another samaritan,
regardless of its timestamp.
Basic structure.
Each node proceeds through lgF super-epochs, before
falling back to the Trapdoor Protocol, modified as described
below. If all n nodes start at the same time, and if the ad-
versary blocks only t′ < t frequencies, then all nodes com-
plete the synchronization protocol by the end of super-epoch
log 2t′. (See Figure 2 for an overview of the round structure.)
Each super-epoch consists of lgN + 2 epochs. In epoch
e ≤ lgN , we define probability pe = 2e/2N ; for the final
two epochs, define pe = 1/2. This probability reflects the
probability that a node broadcasts. Each epoch consists
of s(k) = Θ(2k log3N) rounds. In super-epoch k, during
each epoch e ≤ lgN , a contender or a samaritan behaves
as follows. In each round, with probability 1/2 it chooses
a frequency at random from the range [1 . . . 2k]; and with
probability 1/2 it chooses a frequency at random from the
range [1 . . .F ]. With probability pe, it decides to broadcast;
with probability (1− pe) it decides to listen.
Contenders and samaritans behave differently in the last
two epochs of each super-epoch. In each round, with proba-
bility 1/2, they choose a frequency at random from the range
[1 . . . 2k] and broadcast with probability pe as before. With
probability 1/2, however, the round is designated as special :
in this case, a contender chooses some d ∈ [1 . . .F ] uni-
formly at random, and selects a frequency at random from
the range [1 . . . 2d]. It then broadcasts with probability 1/2,
and listens with probability 1/2.
Becoming the leader.
The goal of the contender is to successfully send a suffi-
cient number of messages during epoch lgN + 1 of a super-
epoch; if this occurs, then it can go on to become leader.
The only way it can discover whether its messages were suc-
cessfully sent, however, is by learning from a good samaritan
that its messages were successfully received. When a good
samaritan receives a message from a contender u in some
round r, where: (a) round r is part of epoch lgN + 1; (b)
round r is not designated as special by either the contender
or the samaritan, and (c) both the contender and the samar-
itan were awakened in the same round, then the samaritan
records the fact that round r was successful for u.
Let s(k) be the length of an epoch in super-epoch k. If
a contender in super-epoch k learns from a good samaritan
that it was successful in at least s(k)/2k+6 rounds of epoch
lgN + 1, then it becomes a leader. We say that an epoch
in which a contender sends a sufficient number of successful
messages is a critical epoch.
Afterward.
Once a contender becomes a leader, it continues in every
round to first choose an integer d ∈ [1 . . .F ] at random, and
then to choose a frequency at random in the range [1 . . . 2d],
and then to broadcast its preferred round numbering with
probability 1/2. Any node that receives a message from a
leader immediately abandons its protocol, adopts the speci-
fied round numbering, and ceases to contend.
If an unsynchronized node exits the last super-epoch with-
out becoming a leader, then it continues to execute the mod-
ified Trapdoor protocol. Specifically, in every round, it flips
a coin with probability 1/2, and either executes a round
of the Trapdoor protocol, or a special round of the Good
Samaritan Protocol:
Super Epoch # k = 1 to logF
Epoch # 1 2 . . . lgN lgN + 1 lgN + 2
Length Θ
`
2k log3N
´
Θ
`
2k log3N
´
. . . Θ
`
2k log3N
´
Θ
`
2k log3N
´
Θ
`
2k log3N
´
Probability 1/N 2/N . . . 1/2 1/2 1/2
Probability of
Choosing
Frequency f
8><>:
P[f ] = 1/2k+1 + 1/2F : f ≤ 2k
P[f ] = 1/2F : f > 2k P[f ] =
2blg (F/f)c+1 − 1
2F lgF + 1/2
k+1
Figure 2: Epoch structure, broadcast prob., and frequency distributions for the Good Samaritan Protocol.
• With probability 1/2, it executes the Trapdoor pro-
tocol, where each epoch is of length Θ(F log3 n), i.e.,
at least four times as long as the longest epoch of the
Good Samaritan Protocol. (When executing the Trap-
door protocol, timestamps are again used to determine
when a node is knocked out.)
• With probability 1/2, it executes a special round of
the Good Samaritan protocol: it chooses an integer d ∈
[1 . . . logF ] at random, and then chooses a frequency at
random in the range [1 . . . 2d], broadcasting a message
with probability 1/2.
Any contender that has not yet begun the modified Trap-
door protocol that receives a message is downgraded. We
refer to the lgF super-epochs as the optimistic portion of
the Good Samaritan protocol, and the modified Trapdoor
Protocol as the fallback portion.
7.2 Analysis
We now provide a brief outline of the analysis for the
Good Samaritan Protocol, focusing on where it differs from
the Trapdoor Protocol. We begin by showing that at most
one leader is elected during the optimistic portion of the
Good Samaritan Protocol.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that two nodes u
and v both become leaders during the optimistic portion of
the Good Samaritan Protocol, and the u begins its critical
epoch no later than v. Let w be the good samaritan that
assists w in becoming leader. Let k be the super-epoch in
which v becomes leader.
We treat the random choices made by all other nodes, as
well as the choices of the adversary, as fixed and indepen-
dent of the choices made by u, v, and w. For each such
set of random/adversarial choices, we bound the probabil-
ity that u and v both become leaders. We observe that in
each round during v’s critical epoch, the adversary disrupts
some frequencies, and the other nodes may broadcast on
some frequencies. Let pa(r) be the fraction of frequencies
that are neither disrupted by the adversary in round r, nor
broadcast on by any of the other nodes. (Note that pa(r)
is a random variable that depends on the random choices of
the other nodes.) We then calculate that the probability of
node v successfully sending a message to the samaritan w in
round r during the critical epoch is ≤ pa(r)
2k+3
. If w receives a
sufficient number of message from v, then there must be a
sufficient number of rounds in which the frequencies are not
too disrupted:
Lemma 11. If v becomes leader, then there are at least
s(k)/32 rounds in the critical epoch for v such that pa(r) ≥
1/32, with high probability.
(Otherwise, node v succeeds, in expectation, in sending at
most s(k)/2k+7 messages to w, which is insufficient.) From
this we can obtain a contradiction, by arguing that, with
high probability, v must receive a message from u during one
of those s(k)/32 “good” rounds. (In expectation, u delivers
s(k)/2k+14 logN messages to v, and s(k) ≥ Ω(2k log2N).)
Lemma 12. At most one node becomes leader during the
optimistic portion of the Good Samaritan protocol, with high
probability.
The next step is to show that the modified Trapdoor Pro-
tocol continues to work. As in the previous analysis in
Lemma 8, we can show that if the broadcast weight gets too
high, then the probability of getting knocked out is high,
which leads again to a bound on the total broadcast weight.
Some additional care is needed, as now we must bound sep-
arately the three different weights: W1, the weight of Good
Samaritan contenders, W2, the weight of samaritans, and
W3, the weight of contenders in the modified Trapdoor Pro-
tocol:
Lemma 13. Let R be a round with at most one leader, and
c be some positive constant c > 3/2. For all rounds r ≤ R,
with high probability: (a)W1(r) < 3cF ; (b)W1(r)+W2(r) <
9cF ; (c) W3(r) ≤ 3cF .
As in the original analysis, we can then show that the first
contender to become leader successfully knocks out any later
contenders. Some care is needed, as the smallest of the chan-
nels may be too congested. Instead, we rely only on chan-
nels in the range [F/4, . . . ,F ] to show that contenders are
knocked out.
Lemma 14. The modified Trapdoor protocol chooses only
one leader, with high probability.
Finally, we examine the interactions between the optimistic
portion of the protocol and the modified Trapdoor Protocol.
Assume some node v becomes leader during the optimistic
portion, and some other node u becomes leader during the
fallback protocol. There are two cases to consider.
Assume that node u began its final epoch first. We con-
clude that during every round of v’s critical epoch, u is con-
tending or acting as leader. It is easy to see, by the same
argument as in Lemma 12, that node u knocks out v. (Here
we take advantage of the fact that with probability 1/2, u
performs a special round of the Good Samaritan protocol,
and hence with probability 1/ lgF chooses the same range
of channels being used by v. This also relies on the fact that
there are at least s(k)/32 “good” rounds during v’s critical
epoch.)
By contrast, consider the case where v begins its critical
epoch no later than u begins its final epoch. In this case,
since u’s final epoch is at least four times longer than v’s,
we conclude that after v becomes leader, it has sufficiently
many rounds to knock out u, preventing u from becoming
the leader. (Here we also take advantage of the fact that
the broadcasts weights are bounded, hence not causing too
much congestion.)
Putting together Lemmas 11, 12, 13, and 14, we conclude:
Theorem 15. The Good Samaritan protocol chooses at
most one leader, with high probability.
It remains only to show that when all the nodes start at
the same time, and when only t′ channels are disrupted in
each round, then a leader is elected. This proceeds much as
before, first bounding the total broadcast weight, this time
focusing on the first 2t′ channels:
Lemma 16. Let R be a round in the first lgN epochs with
at most one leader, and c be some positive constant c > 3/2.
For all rounds r ≤ R, with high probability: (a) W1(r) <
6ct′; (b) W1(r) +W2(r) < 18ct′.
We then argue that by the end of epoch logN there is exactly
one contender and one good samaritan remaining. This fol-
lows from the same argument as was used in Theorem 10
to show that there is exactly one leader remaining in the
Trapdoor Protocol, except here focusing only on the first 2t′
channels:
Lemma 17. By the end of epoch lgN , there is one con-
tender and one samaritan, with high probability.
We now observe that the good samaritan receives sufficiently
many messages from the contender in epoch lgN + 1, and
that the contender receives enough messages from the good
samaritan in epoch logN + 1. This follows from a simple
probability calculation, as there are no longer any other con-
tenders/samaritans causing unexpected disruptions.
Finally, we conclude that once a leader is chosen, every
node soon receives a synchronizing message from it, and we
conclude with the main result:
Theorem 18. The Good Samaritan protocol solves the
wireless synchronization problem with an oblivious adver-
sary, and has the following properties:
• In every execution, the synchronization problem is solved
within O(F log3N) rounds.
• If all n ≤ N nodes awake in the same round, and if
n ≥ 2, and if the adversary disrupts at most t′ ≤ t
frequencies per round, then every node completes the
synchronization within O(t′ log3N) rounds.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduce the wireless synchronization
problem for disrupted single-hop radio networks. We present
lower bounds on the efficiency of synchronization, and de-
scribe two new synchronization protocols. Of note, the first
protocol nearly matches the lower bound, and the second has
an optimistic mode in which it decides rapidly in executions
that have little interference and synchronized activations.
Unsynchronized rounds.
Throughout this paper, we assumed that nodes agree in
advanced on synchronized round boundaries. In general,
however, slotted communication models can be transformed
into non-slotted models, with a constant multiplicative cost;
c.f., [1]. We believe that similar techniques can be applied
to modify our protocols to work in a setting without syn-
chronized round boundaries. We leave the consideration of
the details of this transformation as important future work.
Broader implications.
The techniques developed in this paper can be used to
solve a variety of problems. A common round view allows
protocols that require synchronous activation to be used in
our more realistic ad hoc setting. Notice, our protocols elect
a unique leader as a sub-problem, and a leader combined
with a common round view simplifies consensus, maintain-
ing replicated state, and the collection and distribution of
messages, among other useful problems.
Fault-tolerance.
A natural question is whether wireless synchronization can
be achieved in the presence of nodes joining, leaving, crash-
ing, and/or restarting. We can easily modify the Trapdoor
Protocol to tolerate crash failures: whenever a node does not
receive a message from the leader for sufficiently long (e.g.,
Ω(F2/(F − t) logN) rounds), it restarts. Moreover, each
node delays outputting a round number until it has received
sufficiently many messages from the leader (thus ensuring
that every node has received a message from the leader).
Assuming the adversary is oblivious (and designates failures
prior to the random choices made during the execution),
then a correct leader is chosen and the nodes synchronize in
the same asymptotic time. On the other hand, it remains a
challenging open question to perform synchronization in the
presence of Byzantine failures or arbitrary state corruptions.
Other open questions.
There remain several interesting related questions to con-
sider. First, we conjecture that the Trapdoor Protocol is op-
timal. This motivates work on improving our lower bound;
the log logN factor can likely be eliminated using the linear
programming techniques of [17], but closing the remaining
gap presents a challenge. In particular, the (F − t) terms is
an artifact of focusing on the necessary, but not sufficient,
sub-problem of achieving a single undisrupted broadcast. It
also remains open whether better optimistic protocols can
be developed, such as protocols that do not require all the
nodes to begin in the same round. It would also be inter-
esting to explore whether synchronization can be achieved
deterministically (perhaps usingmulti-selectors [19]), or how
our results can be adapted to multiple hops.
Beyond synchronization itself, there remain a diversity
of open questions concerning the disrupted radio channel
model—what other problems can we solve and what limi-
tations are inherent? Even some basic questions—e.g., Can
agreement be reached? How fast? Under what conditions—
are not yet answered.
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